Belichick, Peyton Manning, and 4th down decisions
Posted by Chase Stuart on November 16, 2009
Internet message boards, twitter feeds and sports media are blowing up over Bill Belichick's decision to go for it on 4th and 2 from his own 28-yard line, up by six points, with 2:08 remaining. First, a quick review of the play.
The Pats came out with three WRs to Brady's left, with Wes Welker the nearest receiver to Brady on that side of the field. On Brady's right was Randy Moss isolated out wide, with Kevin Faulk in the backfield. Indy came out looking like they were going to blitz six -- they had the four WRs in tight, man-coverage, and safety Melvin Bullitt about fifteen yards deep to Brady's right. Brady then sent #33, Kevin Faulk, to go line up as the inside WR on the right side, and #33 (Bullitt) for the Colts came in to line up against him. Indy was now going to rush six against NE's five, while NE knew all five of their WRs were in single coverage. Brady recognized that he was going to have to make a quick and accurate pass.
It turns out that Faulk was the primary read all along, as he took twp steps, did a quick fake left, and then curled right just a yard or so past the first-down marker. Since the drive started after a touchback, the Pats needed to get to exactly the 30-yard line for the first down. The ball hit Faulk's hands but he bobbled the ball; Bullitt pushed Faulk backwards, and by the time he landed with possession of the ball, he was on New England's side of the 30-yard line.
So... did Belichick make the right call by deciding to go for it on 4th and 2 from his own 28? It goes without saying that New England made a significant blunder by using two timeouts on that drive, including an inexplicable timeout called before leaving the huddle on first down. Had the Pats had even one timeout left, they could have challenged Kevin Faulk's catch (based on the replays we saw, I don't think there was enough evidence to overturn the call, but NBC viewers hardly got to see every angle of that play).
Just about all of the players, former players, and members of the mainstream media are blasting Belichick's decision. JKL told me he thought it was the right move last night. Neil posted this morning that he agrees. Brian Burke strongly supports the move. Here's how I view it:
1) Over the past five NFL seasons, the average conversion rate on a 3rd- or 4th-and-two is 56%. Now what factors make this different than average?
- Tom Brady, Randy Moss and Wes Welker are way better than average. Since Moss and Welker arrived in 2007, Brady had been 11 of 19 (58%) in that situation and Matt Cassel with those same WRs had been 9 of 12 (75%) in converting in those spots. We can safely say that the Patriots are a better passing offense than the average team.
- The Pats were on the road, in a very loud and hostile environment. On the other hand, the play is taking place in a dome, where it's a little bit easier to pass.
- Indianapolis has a very good pass defense statistically, but the Colts secondary had been depleted due to injuries in the past couple of weeks. The Colts pass defense was probably below average at this point, and Brady was 28/41 for 374 yards, 3 TDs and 1 INT (9.5 AY/A) on the night heading in to that play.
- The Pats had just failed in this exact position a few seconds ago. Additionally, this was a high-pressure play, but I don't see why the pressure wouldn't affect both teams evenly on this play. I don't think either of these factors are significant.
- This was harder than your typical 3rd- or 4th-and-two situation because the defense was only going to be playing for the first down. In a normal 3rd-and-two, the defense has to still worry about a big play, and can't sell out to stop a two-yard gain. Here, the Colts could do that. In effect, that makes this much more similar to a two-point conversion than a 3rd-and-two. Last year, Brian Burke said that two-point conversions are successful about 44% of the time in the NFL.
- On the other hand, this was still a little bit easier than a typical two-point attempt. The back of the end zone isn't an extra defender, you can send two WRs deep to take two DBs with them, leaving the WRs you care about with more room to operate. And the Colts could have only showed blitz and faked it (which they did with one of their two blitzers), allowing NE the time to take advantage of that.
After factoring in all of those things, where do you put the percentages at of NE converting the first down? I don't know the answer. The best I can do is estimate, and I'll estimate those odds at 60%. Now we need to know the odds of the Colts scoring the game-winning touchdown from either the Pats 28-yard line or, roughly, the Colts 32-yard line (following a 40-yard net punt). What are those odds? Going 28 yards in 2 minutes with one timeout is certainly easier than going 68 yards in 2 minutes with one timeout. But how much easier?
The table below shows the break-even probabilities necessary for the 68-yard drive, assuming the given probability for the 28-yard drive.
28 yds 68 yds 90% 36% 85% 34% 80% 32% 75% 30% 70% 28% 65% 26% 60% 24% 55% 22% 50% 20% 45% 18% 40% 16% 35% 14% 30% 12% 25% 10%
So, if you think the Colts had a 75% chance of scoring from the Patriots' 28, then if you think the Colts had a better than 30% chance of driving 68 yards for the score, Belichick was right; if you think the Colts had a lower than 30% chance of driving that far, Belichick was wrong. If you think the Colts had a 90% chance of scoring once the Pats missed the conversion, then if you think the Colts had a better than 36% chance of scoring the game-winning touchdown from the 68, then Belichick was right; if Indianapolis' odds would have been lower than that, Belichick was wrong.
What are the actual odds? I don't know. You don't know. I'll never know. You'll never know. But we can think this through a little bit more carefully.
We know that the last few yards of a drive are always the toughest, because the field gets a lot smaller the closer the offense gets to the end zone. Therefore, we can stipulate that driving 28 yards is NOT half as easy as driving 56 yards. Think of a 56-yard drive as a 28-yard drive to the 28, and then a 28-yard drive to the end zone. The first "drive" is always going to be easier than the second one. Let's assume you have a 70% (just picking a number) chance of scoring from the 28; you must have a greater than 49% chance (0.70*0.70) of scoring from your own 44-yard line, ignoring things like time on the clock. We're talking abstractly here. If you have a 70% chance of scoring on the short drive, you probably have something closer to a 55% chance of scoring on the longer drive.
Now here, we're looking at a 28-yard drive vs. a 68-yard drive. Here, I think the long drive is about "twice as hard" to convert as the short drive. If you have a 70% chance of converting on the short drive, maybe you have a 49% chance of scoring on the long drive. The big element we're leaving out here is the time on the clock: Peyton Manning only had two minutes to drive his team, not all day. On the other hand, the Pats were much more likely to have time to kick a game-winning FG following a Colts score if they went for it than if they punted; on the short field, Manning's more likely to leave some time on the clock. Do these two factors cancel each other out? I don't know.
So what are the odds of the Colts driving 28 or 68 yards with 1 timeout, 2 minutes to go, at home against that New England defense? I don't know. Brian Burke says teams needing 66 yards to go (he assumed a net punt of 38 yards) convert around 30% of the time; surely for Peyton Manning, it would be much higher. Conversely, while here Manning has four downs and won't settle for a field goal (things that make the Colts more likely to score a TD than normally), the Colts have nowhere near a 2:1 ratio of offensive drives to offensive touchdowns. As good as the Colts offense is, they don't normally score TDs on half of their possessions that begin on their side of the field. And while that extra down (and motivation to not settle for the field goal) helps, they're also up against the clock.
I think a reasonable prediction for the Colts to drive for a TD following a punt is 40%; better than league average, but I still would have expected the Pats to win the game if they punted. Had Peyton Manning driven the Colts down the field to win, it would have been an outstanding drive, not one I would say was more likely than not to happen. Giving the Colts a 40% chance of scoring the long touchdown basically ends the analysis; only if the Colts were exactly 100% likely to score a touchdown following a failed 4th-down-attempt would it make the probabilities even. Since the Colts were not guaranteed to score on the short drive, going for it was the right call.
To assign some final probabilities to the situation, punting would give the Pats a roughly 60% chance to win (ignoring things like blocked punts, quick IND scores followed by NE scores, etc.). Going for it would give the Pats a 70% chance to win (60% chance to win following a successful 4th-down play, and a 1-in-4 chance of stopping the Colts the other 40% of the time). While we're using very fuzzy math here, I doubt you can come up with convincing math that says it was overwhelmingly a bad call to go for it here.
I will say this -- and not just because I don't like the Patriots. Thank goodness the play went down the way it did. Can you imagine the reaction if Faulk cleanly caught the ball?
Michaels: "And do they make it? Yes the catch is made. Kevin Faulk is there. First down New England!
Collinsworth: "Wow! Can you believe it! Is there ever any doubt that when you need a big play to be made that Kevin Faulk will make it?"
Michaels: "Time after time Kevin Faulk has been a hero for the Patriots, and quite often against these Indianapolis Colts. Just a terrific play by one of the most underrated players in NFL history."
Collinsworth: "Kevin Faulk can do it all. And let me tell you one guy who doesn't underrate Kevin Faulk; that's his QB Tom Brady. It says quite a lot about how valuable the Patriots think this guy is to their team that with the game on the line, on a team with Randy Moss and Wes Welker, they trust Kevin Faulk to make the catch."
Michaels: "And why not? He always does."
Well, except this time. Faulk's catch wasn't easy, but it should have been made cleanly. He was one-on-one with a backup safety. The pass hit his hands. If he catches the ball, the Patriots win and he's the hero. If he drops the ball, Belichick becomes the goat. And that's why most coaches never go for it in that situation.
November 16th, 2009 at 10:50 am
The faux announcer analysis at the end was the best part of this piece. The other stuff was good, but the Collinsworth-Michaels dialogue was priceless.
November 16th, 2009 at 11:35 am
2-pt conversions aren't successful just 44% of the time; that number includes botched extra point attempts that result in no kick.
November 16th, 2009 at 12:13 pm
One thing to add. The Pats punter this season is averaging 35 yards net a punt on 38 yards average. This should not make a huge difference but it is 5 yards less the Colts would need to go.
November 16th, 2009 at 12:15 pm
Thanks for this. I think Peter King needs to read this and take another look at his statement in today's MMQB column that the decision was "the wrong call no matter which was you dissect it".
It's odd how opinionated the public and the media can be without really analyzing the situation at all. I think it shows how far the league still has to go in terms of math based decision making and possibly how far ahead of the game Belichick is.
November 16th, 2009 at 12:24 pm
Bill Simmons has mentioned the concept that coaches should do the opposite of what opposing fans are rooting for in tough calls.
In this case, I am sure that most Colts fans wanted New England to punt in this situation. Colts fans felt that giving Manning the ball with 2 minutes and 70 yards to win is a good situation. Giving Brady the ball with 2 yards to go for the Patriots win is a bad situation.
I think Belichick made the right call. I think the odds are much higher than 40% that Manning leads a touchdown drive following a punt.
November 16th, 2009 at 12:25 pm
Blah,
Assuming you're correct, that makes going for it an even better call. Due to a relatively low sample size I'm not sure if we can figure out what the "true" conversion rate is; I wouldn't be surprised if it was 44%, 50% or 54%.
Jim,
Punting averages are heavily dependent on situation. I suspect -- without knowing if it's true -- that most punters, the Pats punter included, would average more net yards per punt when punting on their own 30 than in most situations. Net averages can be skewed down by punts in opponent's territory; I suspect the average punt at the 30 yard line nets around 40 yards.
November 16th, 2009 at 12:27 pm
I won't link to the article TJ, but yes, that was not King's finest hour of journalism. My buddy Maurile wrote:
November 16th, 2009 at 12:30 pm
Richie,
That's what Doug calls his "intuitive proof." http://www.pro-football-reference.com/blog/?p=40
November 16th, 2009 at 12:54 pm
Math is hard.
November 16th, 2009 at 1:07 pm
"(ignoring things like blocked punts, quick IND scores followed by NE scores, etc.)"
Of course NE could have CHOSEN to allow a quick score, and specifically had the opportunity but declined it. Once Addai had rushed inside the 5 and almost certainly gotten the first down on the second play of the last Indy drive, there was little to no advantage to stopping him short, since the odds of scoring First and Goal inside the 5 are near 100%, especially for Manning and the Colts. If the NE secondary lets Addai walk in the last 5 yards, Brady would have had around 1:10 or so (after a kickoff) to get into FG range.
November 16th, 2009 at 1:38 pm
Doofman (#10), I disagree. The last few yards are by far the hardest; it's very easy for anyone, even Peyton, to throw an INT in the endzone, where you have 11 guys in a small area. From the 1 is another question, I suppose, but from the 5 (where it's not just a couple of quick dives) it's quite hard to score.
November 16th, 2009 at 1:57 pm
from the reaction I've seen in the past 14 hours, I see why the punt is so common in this situation. a lesser coach would be facing the probability of losing his job. Imagine if Raheem Morris or Jim Zorn did this- they'd be finished at the end of the season. no matter what the math says, if the overwhelming "expert opinion" says that you punt in that situation, you punt for job security.
November 16th, 2009 at 3:12 pm
since the "pundits" seem to think Peyton's chance of scoring from 70 yds out was 35%, here's proof that the correct decision was to punt: Manning already had two 79 yd drives for TD's in the 4th Qtr, so his likelihood of getting a 3rd was 2%, right? Or maybe his likelihood was more like 100%, since the Pats D had already proved it couldn't stop him.
November 16th, 2009 at 3:17 pm
Absolutely ridiculous argument that fails to take into consideration where they were on the field and the non-quantifiable issue of sending the defense a message that he has no confidence in them. I cannot believe that this article makes the argument based on these ridiculous statistics that fail to take into consideration the situation that this play occurred in. I'm a Patriots fan and was screaming "this is suicide" before they snapped the ball. If it was successful, I would've stood by that and said that they were fortunate that a bad call worked out. Worst call I've ever seen.
November 16th, 2009 at 3:17 pm
dan, you have rendered me speechless.
November 16th, 2009 at 3:30 pm
Interesting points. I will only add that this proves that the game itself is more interesting than the storylines. As hyped as Brett Favre returning to Lambeau was, I don't remember nearly the postgame discussion as we're seeing after this game.
November 16th, 2009 at 3:32 pm
There are not many 60+ yard TD drives that start in the final 2:00 to win a game in the NFL. For that reason alone, I punt the ball and trust my defense. There's so much that can go wrong on an Indy drive when they have that far to go. At the 29, it's basically a given they're going to get it done.
And I would have had my defense prepared to let them score as soon as they got into a goal-to-go situation so that Brady had enough time to get the FG drive. Because this is different from the MJD/Jets situation. They only needed a FG, while Manning needed a TD and it's a lot harder to try and get a TD while still burning clock. You score whenever you can.
November 16th, 2009 at 4:49 pm
I support Belichick's decision. Mike, they are not "statistics". They are "probabilities". Before you critisize, learn the difference. There are not enough historical 70-yard-Manning-2-minute-drives-vs.-the-Pats to be able to call them "statistics".
Scott... when you use words like "so much can go wrong" and "it's basically a given", you should replace those words with probablities or you're not selling anyone with your comments.
November 16th, 2009 at 5:33 pm
The most predictable thing about bill's decision was the reaction from the masses that would follow:
Pats convert: Bill is a genius. PATS ARE AWESOME...(vomit in mouth)
Pats don't convert but still win: Peyton chokes again.
Pats don't convert and lose: OMG WORST CALL EVER!
November 16th, 2009 at 5:49 pm
RE: post 14 by Mike
Tremendous, tremendous post. I have nothing to add other than that.
November 16th, 2009 at 5:49 pm
Silly stats. Any fool can see that the chances of the Pats winning if they punted was the square root of negative pi.
November 16th, 2009 at 6:11 pm
Dude, what the hell do you have against Kevin Faulk? This is not like baseball announcers salivating over David Eckstein. Faulk is a good player and he has come up in many big situations for the Patriots. He has some of the best hands on the team, it's the reality. He just didn't make that catch.
November 16th, 2009 at 6:14 pm
How can you say that this analysis didn't take into account where they were on the field? That's the basis of the entire analysis.
November 16th, 2009 at 6:31 pm
How does this tell the defense he has no confidence in them? He was saying "If we convert, we win. If we don't convert, I have confidence that our defense can stop them on a short field." I think it's reading too much into a tactical decision either way, but I don't think confidence in their offense implies lack of confidence in their defense. Too much doublethink going on here.
November 16th, 2009 at 6:38 pm
http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/11/16/bill-belichick-is-great/
Quote from article:
If his team had gotten the first down and the Patriots won, he would have gotten far less credit than he got blame for failing. This introduces what economists call a “principal-agent problem.” Even though going for it increases his team’s chance of winning, a coach who cares about his reputation will want to do the wrong thing. He will punt, just because he doesn’t want to be the goat. (I’ve seen the same thing in my research on penalty kicks in soccer; it looks like kicking it right down the middle is the best strategy, but it is so embarrassing when it fails that players don’t do it often enough.) What Belichick proved by going for it last night is that 1) he understands the data, and 2) he cares more about winning than anything else.
November 16th, 2009 at 9:58 pm
Not all fourth downs are equal. How do we account for the fact that the game was on the line, unlike most of the other 4th downs used to look at probabilities? Other than what Chase said about only defending the first down, does the game situation favor the offense or the defense?
It also seems that there might have been some short-term psychological impact on the Patriots' D as they looked flat in the last 2 minutes. No one was flying to the ball and Addai had that long effort run.
Still, a great analysis on these two posts.
There is some divided opinion; Chris Carter said he was OK with the call on Mike and Mike this morning.
November 16th, 2009 at 10:17 pm
This game was just fantastic. So exciting, it lived up to the hype.
The 4th and 2 call was definitely all or nothing, I don't mind the call Belichick made. I don't think it was lack of confidence in his defense as much as more confidence in his offense. And it is Peyton, he would've went 65 yards as easy as he went the 30 or so.
Hope they meet again in the playoffs.
November 17th, 2009 at 4:35 am
I think the right call was made to go for it, but I think in the end it was a bad playcall.
They wanted to get it to Kevin Faulk about 3-4 yards downfield for the 1st down. Fine, but why run and throw into an area that was also going to be occupied by Randy Moss running a short comeback route and his defender.
You want Faulk or Welker isolated on a LB in this situation Faulk was covered by the S, and on the otherside had Wes Welker running a short cross into the middle of the field...Brady went to the wrong place with the football.
Welker was the option that Brady needed to take and he didn't. If that Ball goes to Welker it is an easy catch and 1st down for the Pats.
Do not blame the call one bit, blame the execution, better yet blame Laurence Maroney for fumbling the ball at the 1 yard line.
November 17th, 2009 at 8:27 am
re #11 - from the data dominator at football guys, from 2002-2009, Peyton has 142 pass attempts between the opp goalline and the 5 yd line. He has completed 75 passes for 68 TDs and 4 INTs. That's an INT rate of 2.8%, almost identical to his career 2.7%, although a little higher than his 2.2% rate from 2002-2009. Basically, he is no more likely to throw an INT from there than he is from anywhere else.
Interestingly, in the rest of the red zone, from the 6-20, he threw INTs at a 2.0% rate from 2002-2009 - a little lower than overall, although in either case probably not statistically significant.
I think the ability to throw the ball away more easily in the red zone and especially at the goalline (he can just zing a high pass thru the end zone without getting called for intentional grounding unlike elsewhere on the field) offsets the packed in defense in keeping his INT rate down.
November 17th, 2009 at 9:08 am
Here's some cool data (well, to me anyhow), maybe everyone else already knows this:
2002-2009 NFL
overall cmp rate 60.1%
int rate 3.8%
red zone cmp rate 53.3%
int rate 3.6%
goalline* cmp rate 48.1%
int rate 3.8%
*LOS from the 5 yardline to the goalline
essentially, as teams get closer to the end zone, their completion rate drops but their INT rate stays the same. I would have expected the decrease in comp rate but would have expected an increased INT rate.
November 17th, 2009 at 11:17 am
Its amazing how many people don't take the time to read the argument.
@Scott Kacsmar, Chase has the number of 68 yard drives that succeed, right there, in the article, taken into account in the analysis. Your right that they don't succeed that often, but they do about 1/3 of the time. That's not a negligible chance, and given what we know about Manning and his play up to that point he probably had a better than average chance. Given that, the call was the right call.
November 17th, 2009 at 11:19 am
Lost in the all the nonsense being spouted by a great many ignorant people (sports commentators & fans, alike) who really know little or nothing about football in general and the Patriots in particular, especially compared to Belichick, is the simple fact that even if the Pats had punted the ball away, they still might have lost the game. So, it's ridiculous of anybody to say that the decision cost the Pats the game. Peyton Manning had, after all, led the Colts to long quick-strike TDs in the fourth quarter, and might well have added a third if given that opportunity.
We'll never know, and that's the point.
richard j. brenner
PS when it comes to football decisions about the Pats, I'll continue to assume that their coach is more knowledgeable and more likely to make the correct decision than I am, regardless of how any particular choice plays out. And let's remember that the failure of the execution, doesn't invalidate the basis for the decision, just like blind good luck wouldn't validate a poor decision.
November 17th, 2009 at 11:40 am
The INT make sense. The denser defense in the red zone is balanced by the lack of 50 yard bombs thrown up for grabs.
November 17th, 2009 at 12:26 pm
Why blame Maroney? The Colts punted on the following drive, and then the Patriots scored a touchdown after that.
November 17th, 2009 at 1:52 pm
Re: #31 Dan, I'm not seeing any hard numbers here on 68 yard winning TD drives in the final 2:00. I'm seeing estimates.
I can tell you there have been 31 GW TD drives in the 4th quarter this season. I can tell you that FOUR of them started in the last 2:00, and TWO of those went 68+ yards.
If you've paid a lot of attention this season, you probably know which games it happened in. Orton's miracle/fluke play to Stokley against the Bengals (0:34 left, 87 yards), Brady against Buffalo after the fumbled kickoff (1:56 left, 31 yards), Favre's miracle pass against the 49ers (1:29 left, 80 yards), and of course Manning in this game (2:00 left, 29 yards).
There was one other that went 80 yards and started with 2:15 (Bengals/Ravens), so if you want to count that, then I think that's ok (though I don't recall what their timeout situation was). Also Rivers took the Chargers 80 yards starting with 2:05 left against the Giants, so that can count as well.
Still, it's not something that happens a lot. I don't have the number of failed attempts worked out this season, though I can get it. I know all the failed drives, I just didn't keep track of the time they started or the starting LOS.
But if the definition is final 2:00, 68+ yards, then we've seen that successfully pulled off twice in 2009. And it took some pretty incredible TD plays to do.
November 17th, 2009 at 2:22 pm
All I know is that everyone except the current Patriot players are analysizing and second-guessing Belichick. The Patriots are standing behind their coach and understand that he made a decision based on his experience, intuition, and data in combination. That, I think is more important than the result of the call or the subsequent drive. Belichick had every reason in the world to think through the probabilities and come to his conclusion. He tried, it failed, the Colts executed, game over. Get over it and learn from the Patriots players.
November 17th, 2009 at 5:03 pm
Alright, how about these numbers.
1. This drive was the FIRST time in Peyton Manning's career he led a game-winning TD drive that started in the final 2:00 of the 4th quarter.
2. Manning led the Colts 85 yards starting with 1:41 left in that classic Tampa Bay comeback in 2003. That was the game-tying TD to force OT, not a GW drive. Though you can certainly compare it to this situation.
3. Manning has led 5 GW FG drives and one tying FG drive in the last 2:00 (but obviously you can't compare FGs here).
4. If you want to branch out a little further beyond 2:00, you'll get only 3 more TDs
- 61 yards starting w/2:15 at the Jets in 2006
- 80 yards starting w/2:17 in the 2006 AFC-C vs. NE
- 20 yards starting w/2:36 in the Rosenfels disaster last year
So if you want to count the Bucs game and the two 60+ yard drives listed above, that means Manning's done this 3 times in his career.
November 17th, 2009 at 7:11 pm
Scott,
Your post is pretty much useless without any idea of how many opportunities Manning has had to have such a drive. He has only lost 29 games in his career by seven points or less.
http://pfref.com/play-index/tiny/z4KRg
Who knows how many of those were OT games that were lost by the Colts and how many of those were games where Manning had a late TD that got them within 7 points to begin with. I suspect that you would be surprised just how few games Manning has had an opportunity to have such a game.
November 17th, 2009 at 10:18 pm
He had that opportunity in the very first game of his career against Miami, so I know it's at least two.
The problem with counting losses is should you count games where they only needed a FG and didn't get it? I feel teams will play it differently if the game is tied, if it's a 1-2 pt deficit, if it's a 3 pt deficit, then maybe even a slight difference between a 4-6 and 7-8 pt deficit.
Then on top of that you'll get games where there's like 30 seconds left and they just get the ball and are expected to score from 70 yards away. Not really comparable to having a full 2:00 left.
Success in that situation is easily defined, but failure is not.
November 18th, 2009 at 7:24 am
although I like your analysis, I find it hard to believe that Bill Belichick did such a complicated analysis on the sidelines. Common wisdom, which may be wrong in this case, would've been to trust your defense and punt the ball. Belichick, has in fact, stuck a stake into the heart of his defense.
November 18th, 2009 at 12:28 pm
Re: #40 - I am guessing that "complicated analysis" takes place mostly in preparation for the game, very little during the game, and certainly a lot after the game leading up to the next game. No slide rule was needed on the sideline when the moment came to make the decision to go for it on fourth down. But it wouldn't surprise me at all if New England had already reckoned with the odds in that type of situation.
Tendencies, statistics, and game strategy go hand in hand with quality control in football and date back to Paul Brown when he first broke down game film to analyze an opponent. Tom Landry's teams in the 60s began using industrial engineering principles to improve play execution, while GM Tex Schramm employed a man named Salam Quereishi to help with computerizing their NFL draft boards.
Honestly, I've got to believe that in this day and age very little is left to chance in the NFL, at least as far as being "informed" goes.
November 18th, 2009 at 1:42 pm
But if Belichick is as statistically inclined as people want to think he is this week, why would you throw the ball on 3rd & 2 and 4th & 2 when the run clearly increases your chances for a first down? Not to mention the Patriots kill teams on QB sneaks, and they kill the Colts with Kevin Faulk draws like we saw all night. It didn't make any sense why you'd go with 2 yard pass plays that seemed to have a wide throw to the right sideline as the #1 read.
November 18th, 2009 at 2:17 pm
Belichick, has in fact, stuck a stake into the heart of his defense.
I didn't realize NFL defensive players were such big babies. If that really is the case, he should release them all and find some players with even a modicum of mental toughness.
November 18th, 2009 at 2:37 pm
One other thing. Should Belichek's decision change depending on his opinion of his defense?
"My defense is spectacular." We probably win it either way, but I think we have a better chance if we go for it.
"My defense is terrible and on their heels." Either way we are in jeopardy of losing, but I think we have a better chance if we go for it.
In all likelihood, no matter what Belichek's view of his defense was the optimal move was to go for it.
It seems to me that people are unsettled by the finality of Belichek's decision. He intentionally put the entire game on one snap. It seems like a gamble to put it all on one play, while punting and spreading it out on 3-8 plays seems like a reasoned decision. I feel the same way watching people play poker on t.v. and seeing them go all in, but sometimes the odds really do say, let's take the roll of the dice now when I need a 1-4 to win rather than taking three more rolls when I need a 1-5 each time to win.
November 18th, 2009 at 2:44 pm
I think you hit the nail on the head with your last sentence there, Sean. I kept wondering *why* I still didn't feel comfortable with the decision even after I worked out the math. Then I realized it's because I have a natural inclination to want to prolong losing for as long as possible. By punting, you lower your odds, but you keep that "I'm still more likely to win than lose" feeling for longer. Of course, that feeling is ultimately useless.
November 18th, 2009 at 4:48 pm
Sean: I hadn't thought of it from that perspective, but that makes an incredible amount of sense from a human perspective. I'm reminded of all those psyche experiments about diffusion of responsibility and the bystander effect.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diffusion_of_responsibility
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bystander_effect
November 18th, 2009 at 11:03 pm
Is this decision really any different than when a team scores a touchdown with no time left in the game to pull within 1 point. An extra point goes to OT and a 2 point conversion gives you the win.
By going for 2 you are choosing to put the whole game on one play. Get the 2.5 yards and you win. Miss and you lose.
If you go for 1, you are surely going to overtime, and then the result of the game is prolonged for up to 15 game minutes.
I would think that going to overtime is close to a 50/50 proposition. I would think that giving Peyton Manning the ball with 2 minutes left and 50+ yards to go gives a team less than 50% chance of winning.
November 20th, 2009 at 1:58 pm
Scott, You posted that P. Manning had 5 GW FG in the final 2 minutes, but no one knows if they might have been TD drives if not for the fact that a only a FG was required to win.
November 21st, 2009 at 3:48 pm
I felt Faulk broke the first down plane and if I heard correctly this is what Phil Simms said either during MNF halftime or somewhere else, plus "New England Tailgate" on Comcast Sports Net did a lengthy film breakdown on that play and showed Faulk had possession, broke the plane, and did so by a yard - more than even I had thought.
November 24th, 2009 at 2:27 pm
According to Tony Dungy (on another controversial decision), you always go with your strength. NE's strength is their offense. Also, only Belichick knew how tired his defense was. He is a great coach, and he makes his decisions strictly on how to WIN THE GAME. The defense must have been tired. In three plays the Colts were on the one yard line. These comments about "sending a bad message to the defense" are ridiculous. These are grown men. They don't wear their psyche on their sleeve. They know they have a good coach and they think he will base a decision on what will win the game. I think the Colts would have won the game even if Belechick had called for a punt.