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Matt Ryan, Brian Brohm, and the right to choose
Matt Ryan is the consensus first quarterback who will be selected in the NFL draft. For example, this site has links to numerous mock drafts on the internet. Ryan is the first quarterback projected in virtually all of the mock drafts linked. However, there is less consensus on where he will go, with some placing him at the first overall, others somewhere in the top five, and the majority having him in the 8th slot to Baltimore. This is similar to what we see from the national draft pundits.
Almost universally, then, Matt Ryan is accepted as the top prospect. The next prospect on most draft boards is Brian Brohm. Chad Henne and Andre Woodson also appear in the majority of top 50 selections in mock drafts. Joe Flacco of Delaware rounds out the top 5 and is placed in the top 50 in about half of the mock drafts. There is almost uniform consensus that those are the top five quarterbacks available, as I did not see any others in anyone's top 50.
So, what is the likelihood that Matt Ryan will actually be better than Brian Brohm, the only other one who is unanimously somewhere in the top 50?
In their NFL Draft study, which Doug has previously discussed in detail here, here, and here, Massey and Thaler discuss some concepts that bear upon the issue of teams selecting quarterbacks in the first round.
One is what they refer to as "non-regressive predictions", which I would paraphrase as the failure to regress player predictions based on past information and history. And as Massey-Thaler point out, "[i]ndeed, to be regressive is to admit to a limited ability to differentiate the good from the great, and it is this skill that has secured NFL scouts and general managers their jobs." I would add "year round draft gurus" to that list.
The other issue is overconfidence (and thus overvaluing the right to choose). According to Massey-Thaler, as teams gain more information on a player (i.e., the Senior Bowl, the combine, individual workouts), they may gain in confidence about their ability to select players, without making significant gains in their true ability to actually differentiate.
I'll try to regress player predictions by actually looking at history, and examining cases where at least two quarterbacks were selected in the top 60 picks in a draft, to see how quarterbacks selected in the first round do head to head with those players selected in close proximity thereafter. Here is a list of all drafts where two or more quarterbacks were drafted in the top 60 selections, going all the way back to the first AFL-NFL common draft in 1967. If you have time, you can reminisce about the amazing 1972 draft. If you just want to get to the results, feel free to skip on down.
================================================================================================== 1967: Steve Spurrier (3), Bob Griese (4), Don Horn (25), Bob Davis (30) 1968: Greg Landry (11), Gary Beban (30), Mike Livingston (48), Ken Stabler (52), Gary Davis (56) 1969: Greg Cook (5), Marty Domres (9), Terry Hanratty (30), Bobby Douglass (41), Al Woodall (52) 1970: Terry Bradshaw (1), Mike Phipps (3), Dennis Shaw (30), Bill Cappleman (51) 1971: Jim Plunkett (1), Archie Manning (2) vs. Dan Pastorini (3), Lynn Dickey (56), Leo Hart (59) 1972: Jerry Tagge (11), John Reaves (14), Pat Sullivan (40) 1973: Bert Jones (2), Gary Huff (33), Ron Jaworski (37), Gary Keithley (45), Joe Ferguson (57) 1975: Steve Bartkowski (1), Mike Franckowiak (54) 1976: Richard Todd (6), Mike Kruczek (47), Jeb Blount (50) 1977: Steve Pisarkiewicz (19), Tommy Kramer (27), Glenn Carano (54) 1978: Doug Williams (17), Matt Cavanaugh (50), Guy Benjamin (51) 1979: Jack Thompson (3), Phil Simms (7), Steve Fuller (23) 1980: Marc Wilson (15), Mark Malone (28), Gene Bradley (37) 1981: Rich Campbell (6), Neil Lomax (33) 1982: Art Schlicter (4), Jim McMahon (5), Oliver Luck (44), Matt Kofler (48) 1983: John Elway (1), Todd Blackledge (7), Jim Kelly (14), Tony Eason (15), Ken O'Brien (24), Dan Marino (27) 1984: Boomer Esiason (38), Jeff Hostetler (59) 1985: Randall Cunningham (37), Frank Reich (57) 1986: Jim Everett (3), Chuck Long (12), Jack Trudeau (47) 1987: Vinny Testaverde (1), Kelly Stouffer (6), Chris Miller (13), Jim Harbaugh (26) 1989: Troy Aikman (1), Mike Elkins (32), Billy Joe Tolliver (51)(10,760) 1990: Jeff George (1), Andre Ware (7), Tommy Hodson (59) 1991: Dan McGwire (16), Todd Marinovich (24), Brett Favre (33), Browning Nagle (34) 1992: David Klingler (6), Tommy Maddox (25), Matt Blundin (40), Tony Sacca (46) 1993: Drew Bledsoe (1), Rick Mirer (2), Billy Joe Hobert (58) 1994: Heath Shuler (3), Trent Dilfer (6) 1995: Steve McNair (3), Kerry Collins (5), Todd Collins (45), Kordell Stewart (60) 1997: Jim Druckenmiller (26), Jake Plummer (42) 1998: Peyton Manning (1), Ryan Leaf (2), Charlie Batch (60) 1999: Tim Couch (1), Donovan McNabb (2), Akili Smith (3), Daunte Culpepper (11), Cade McNown (12), Shaun King (50) 2001: Michael Vick (1), Drew Brees (32), Quincy Carter (53), Marques Tuiasasopo (59) 2002: David Carr (1), Joey Harrington (3), Patrick Ramsey (32) 2003: Carson Palmer (1), Byron Leftwich (7), Kyle Boller (19), Rex Grossman (22) 2004: Eli Manning (1) vs. Philip Rivers (4), Ben Roethlisberger (11), J.P. Losman (22) 2005: Alex Smith (1), Aaron Rodgers (24), Jason Campbell (25) 2006: Vince Young (3), Matt Leinart (10), Jay Cutler (11), Kellen Clemens (49) 2007: JaMarcus Russell (1), Brady Quinn (22), Kevin Kolb (36), John Beck (40), Drew Stanton (43) ==================================================================================================
Now, what I did was put each quarterback in a head to head competition with all others selected in the top 60. As an aside, one of the cool new features of p-f-r's draft lists is that you can sort them by any of the header rows, so if you want to know who threw for the fifth most career passing yards from the class of 1971, you can find that rather quickly.
In my head to head competition, I used two different standards. In one, I gave a win if a quarterback threw for 3,000 or more career yards than another, and a tie if they were within 3,000 yards. In the other, I used 10,000 as the benchmark for needing a "win". Here are the head to head results, sorted by draft position within the top 60, for the draft classes through 2003. Now, is career passing yards the best indicator, no, but its simple and easy to sort, and for the most part does a good enough job with what we are looking at here, namely, comparing players from the same draft class. For example, in looking at the 1999 draft class, Donovan McNabb gets 4 wins (Couch, Akili Smith, McNown, and Shaun King) and 1 tie (Culpepper) in both groups, while Tim Couch gets 3 wins and 2 losses in the 3,000 yard group, but 0 wins, 2 losses, and 3 ties in the 10,000 yards group.
3,000 yards difference 10,000 yards difference
selection W L T PCT W L T PCT
=========================================================================================
1st pick 30 4 3 0.85 22 2 13 0.77
2 to 5 28 19 11 0.58 21 12 25 0.58
6 to 10 7 12 7 0.40 5 9 12 0.42
11 to 20 16 17 12 0.49 13 13 19 0.50
21 to 30 16 16 6 0.50 10 10 18 0.50
31 to 40 13 11 7 0.53 12 8 11 0.56
41 to 50 3 17 10 0.27 1 15 14 0.27
51 to 60 6 25 4 0.23 3 20 12 0.26
=========================================================================================
The First Overall Picks fare pretty well head to head against their peers, and the picks between 41 and 60 generally do not. However, in between, the right to choose between pick #2 and pick #40 generally is not worth much, especially considering the dramatic increase in salary that the difference in those picks requires. This bears some resemblance to the Massey-Thaler values, with some notable exceptions.
Most importantly, when it comes in years when a top "likely not to miss" quarterback is entering the draft, having the first overall selection is not a bad thing, as these quarterbacks who are worthy of the first overall selection are typically better than their peers. It is the picks that follow, in the top 10, that are worth less. Massey-Thaler estimated the most valuable pick in the draft to be #43. For the quarterback position, I would estimate that most valuable pick (besides the first overall) to be more in the 30-35 pick range, and the value to begin to decrease rapidly at around pick 40. Historically, the guys selected late in the first round, and early in the second round, can more than hold their own against the early first round picks, led by guys like Favre, Marino, Esiason, Cunningham, Jaworski, Lomax, and Brees.
Lest you think that the relatively poor showing of the top 10 is due to head to head losses to the first overall picks, here are results, just looking at the players drafted within 30 selections thereafter, to see how valuable the right to choose is.
3,000 yards difference 10,000 yards difference
selection W L T PCT W L T PCT
=========================================================================================
1st pick 18 3 2 0.83 12 2 9 0.72
2 to 5 11 8 5 0.56 6 5 13 0.52
6 to 10 2 8 4 0.29 1 6 7 0.32
11 to 20 8 7 6 0.52 6 6 9 0.50
21 to 30 5 6 4 0.47 2 5 8 0.40
31 to 40 7 4 1 0.63 7 4 1 0.63
41 to 50 9 5 3 0.62 4 4 9 0.50
51 to 60 14 5 9 0.66 12 4 12 0.64
=========================================================================================
It appears that three different tiers of quarterbacks exist for drafting purposes: the first overall picks, everyone else in the first round and early to mid-second round, and then, everyone else, from late second round picks to undrafted free agents. Removing the drafts prior to 1980, back when the draft did not draw as much attention, and the level of information may not have been what it is today, has not improved teams' abilities to differentiate within a tier group of players. What does appear to have happened since the 1980 is that the range for the second tier has tightened down to early to mid-second round range. In the 1970's, numerous top quarterbacks emerged from between picks 50 and 100, including Lynn Dickey, Ken Anderson, Joe Theismann, Joe Ferguson, Dan Fouts, Danny White, Vince Ferragamo, and Joe Montana. Since then, the best that we have seen from this range has been guys like Chris Chandler, Steve Beuerlein, Jeff Hostetler, Jay Schroeder, and Neil O'Donnell.
So, turning back to the five top quarterback prospects, Henne, Woodson and Flacco all are projecting right now at the cutoff between the first round tier, and the "all other quarterbacks" tier. Personally (which means about nothing), I like Chad Henne. When I wasn't hearing him discussed among the top prospects, I had him down as a later round success possibility based on my earlier research. Now, if a team wants to employ the no scouting philosophy, as has been suggested, it can trade down into the early second round, sign Henne for a fraction of Ryan's cost, add another player, and rely on the wisdom of the crowds to determine that Henne is, in fact, an early second round prospect.
Joe Flacco of Delaware is probably the most intriguing. In my earlier post on later round quarterbacks I pointed out that since 1983, only 4 out the 49 non-Division IA prospects who were drafted outside the top 50 even threw 150+ pass attempts in one NFL season--Rich Gannon, John Friesz, Josh McCown, and Craig Whelihan (we can now add Tarvaris Jackson to the list). In contrast, here is a list of all the non-division IA quarterbacks drafted in the top 40 selections in the last 30 years:
Steve McNair-Alcorn State
Ken O'Brien-California-Davis
Neil Lomax-Portland State
Phil Simms-Morehead State
Doug Williams-Grambling
And you could arguably add Chad Pennington and Daunte Culpepper, who played the majority of their careers in Division I-AA before their schools transitioned at the end of their careers. There are no busts on that short list, and it would be my guess that most of these guys were significantly undervalued in the draft considering the regression that Chase came up with in his recent post on black quarterbacks.
The dichotomy is interesting when looking at the small school quarterbacks. Early in a draft, when teams are likely to be more conservative with the "high profile" first round and early second round picks, these guys have represented great value, as teams may have been risk-avoidant of guys that had not played the highest level of competition, but had first round tools. Later in the draft, when teams may be looking to make a splash, the small school guys have been poor value, while the solid (i.e., boring) pocket passer known commodities from big name schools have actually represented good later round value over the last 25 years.
Turning back to the original title, I wouldn't have much confidence that Matt Ryan is in line to be a substantially better pro than Brian Brohm. He may be, he may not be. I'm not predicting that Matt Ryan will be a bust, and I have nothing against him. What I do know is that, if he is not the first overall selection, history does not favor him strongly over the guys taken soon thereafter. I would say that it is maybe slightly better than 50% in favor of Ryan over Brohm. So, if you want to express an opinion that Brohm should be drafted first, you would be in a small minority at this point. However, the reality is teams have not been all that good at distinguishing between early, non-first overall quarterbacks, and late first, early second quarterbacks. Unless all this overload of information and paralysis by analysis actually allows people to make better decisions at such a fine level, I don't have much confidence it will change.
This entry was posted on Monday, March 3rd, 2008 at 6:22 am and is filed under History, NFL Draft. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. Both comments and pings are currently closed.

I will add this--if Team X makes a bad pick of a QB in the top ten, then they are screwed between the salary, positional investment, and the fact that they have to do it again in 3 years while having picked in the top 10 in the years in between. (See the Bengals between Boomer Esiason & Carson Palmer) Rare does it turn out like it did for SD, busting with Ryan Leaf and then shrewdly trading down with Atlanta while getting LDT and Brees. On the other hand, draft the right QB HIGH (both Mannings, Big Ben, Carson Palmer, McNabb, Aikman, and others further back in history) and you are set for years. (Getting lucky in the 6th round with some guy named Brady doesn't hurt either--he's just the exception to the rule.)
I'm assuming you're familiar with the research David Lewin has done for FO/PFP on projecting early round rookie quarterbacks' NFL performance. I think there are two things an NFL GM could very strongly and practically take from it.
1. If your scouts (or indeed possibly the wisdom of crowds) tell you a guy who has started 40 plus games in Division 1A is worth the first overall pick, they are right, and you should move heaven and earth to get him unless you already have a franchise quarterback. Scouts don't miss with that much data, but such prospects come along very rarely.
2. Never, ever, ever draft a guy whose college completion percentage was persistently much below 60, unless there are considerable mitigating factors (like playing for Vanderbilt).
I think using the wisdom of crowds in combination with these two rules would probably lead to pretty good drafting at the position.
Mr. Shush, you are right--I have read the research, and love it. This is why I wonder why some Vikes fans are excited about T. Jackson's "ceiling/upside/potential" and why some media people are down on V. Young's future in Tenn. Young will prob. improve if he gets a couple of NFL quality receivers and a better RB, but I don't see TJax improving much more than he has already. Any NFL team/GM/coach who hasn't read David Lewin's QB research is nuts.
The scariest part of the way QBs are graded, IMO, has nothing to do with being the first overall pick or not, it's that every year the media will come to a consensus on who HAS TO be the first QB off the board for sanity's sake.
There is significant evidence this year to think that Brohm may be the better of the two, the biggest of which being that he statistically improved on a Junior season that pegged him as the No. 1 QB off the board. Ryan's senior season, his completion percentage acutally decreased slightly from his Jr. year.
If you were among the crowd that thought one year ago that Brohm was the top QB in the 2008 class, I have no idea how one would be able to defend it now being Ryan. A sane person would have had to feel that Ryan was the top prospect all along to justify having him No. 1 right now.
What's scary is that no one, I mean NO ONE anywhere is bringing this point up. And, of course, none of this means that Ryan is going to be a bust. It just means that a team who can't justify taking Brohm where they pick should be even more wary of taking Ryan, or at the very least, prepared to face the consequences.
Were all of these QB "TESTS" around in'83, and if so, what were the results? How do you TEST for ABILITY to PERFORM UNDER EXTREME PRESSURE-like that of Conf. Champ. games and S.B.'s? How would we have known that Elway would be able to get it done in 7 such games(5 Conf. Champ. games and 2 S.B.'s), while Marino would only be able to play great in 1 of them(the '84 Conf. Champ. game). Which guys will be able to step up from this year's class-----only time will tell!!
"If you were among the crowd that thought one year ago that Brohm was the top QB in the 2008 class, I have no idea how one would be able to defend it now being Ryan. A sane person would have had to feel that Ryan was the top prospect all along to justify having him No. 1 right now."
Not necessarily. Scouting evaluations are about more than statistics. For instance, if you evaluate QB A after his junior year, you might not see the weaknesses and flaws in his game, especially if other teams have not yet begun to exploit them. So, if he's got a troubling tendency to throw into double coverage or take a sack when the defense does an overload blitz on third down, say, you might not pick up on this because he simply hasn't been in that situation enough times for the pattern to become clear. Or maybe you notice it, but think that it's an easily fixable problem.
If you have another year of game tape to look at, and he still has the same problem dealing with overload blitzes, not only will it be easier to see that the problem exists, but it will make less sense to think that the problem is easily fixed. Yet, QB A could still have just as good a season statistically in his senior year, or even better. Still, it makes sense to downgrade him based on the new information.
In much the same way, you might not have evaluated QB B very highly, but only because you saw weaknesses in his game that you didn't think he would be able to remedy, or because you thought he would have a hard time withstanding the physical wear and tear of the NFL without getting injured. If you had another year of game tapes, and noticed that he had fixed some of the problems in his game, or that he had gone another full year without injury, you might give him a better evaluation, even if he had a slightly worse season statistically.
Another possible reason that certain weaknesses of a QB might not be apparent after two or three years is that his supporting cast might have hid them. For instance, if QB A had a very good O-Line in his first three years, he might not have had to throw many passes quickly under pressure, because he wasn't under pressure quickly very often. If some of the better players on his O-Line graduate or leave for the NFL, then his difficulty with quick pass pressure might become more obvious, and you'd know to downgrade your evaluation of him. Or perhaps all of this happened in his junior year, and then in his senior year, some of the younger players on his O-line improve, and his problem dealing with quick pass pressure isn't such an issue. It might still crop up on occasion (and you'd know to look for it), but it wouldn't necessarily hurt his stats significantly. In fact, the improved O-line performance would likely help his stats, even though his weaknesses remain unchanged. Then, it makes sense to downgrade him, even if his stats improve.
Or, maybe his O-line doesn't get better, it actually gets worse, but he learns how to deal with pass pressure more effectively. Now, his stats might still suffer due to the general decline of his O-line, but you'd be able to see him dealing with a problem that had previously been his Achilles' heel, so you'd upgrade him.
With all of that said, there are obviously times when another season's worth of games just makes people overreact to minor issues, and this Brohm/Ryan thing might very well be one of them. But there are circumstances where it makes sense to change your evaluations in a similar way.
Massey-Thaler estimated the most valuable pick in the draft to be #43.
This is wrong. Massey and Thaler estimated the most valuable pick in the draft to be the #1 overall pick. The graph that shows average performance by draft choice monotonically falls from #1.
What you may be referring to is that Massey and Thaler suggested that pick #43 has more "excess value" than any other draft pick because it has the highest net value when you subtract off the cost of each position.
This isn't value, however. Not from an NFL GM's perspective. The goal of an NFL GM is not to have the roster with the most "excess value." The goal of an NFL GM is to place as much performance on the field as possible.
If you've got two quarterbacks to choose from: one who costs $10M, and will put out $10M worth of performance, and one who costs $500K and will put out $1M worth of performance, who would the NFL GM want? The first, or the second? Clearly, the first - the second is about replacement-level, and provides minimal benefit to the team.
But even if you've got a QB who costs $5M and puts out $6M worth of performance, the NFL GM would clearly want the $10M QB - you can only have 1 QB on the field at a time, so you want to maximize that position.
It should be noted this is entirely different than what you're claiming, which is that for QBs, the most valuable pick is #1 overall (which makes sense), and then the next 30 or so are relatively even.
I'm not sure, with a limited dataset like this, that you can really say anything like that. Players aren't "intrinsically" located at a certain draft spot: they're there because no one above them wanted them. So even if you have a 'great, but not amazing' talent at QB, he'll move around quite a bit in the first round based on what team wants him, and the other talent available in the round.
The #1 overall pick being the most valuable is probably just because it's easier for a player to slide down than up due to talent fluctuations (i.e., slightly more 'elite' players in one year) because the talent distribution curve is steep.
Hey
Matt ryan he is so good i look up to him when i play football i want to be a QB, I think his 2 td's and 2 picks are fine just need to get some more td's Peace
Bigg Timm