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Where have all the fumbling running backs gone?
I was looking through the new leaderboards, including the yearly fumbles category, when I noticed that there sure seemed to be a lot of running backs from the late seventies and early eighties with lots of fumbles. Turns out there were 32 different running back seasons between 1978 and 1985 where a running back had 10 or more fumbles. Since 1990, there have been a grand total of three: Cleveland Gary (1990), Garrison Hearst (1995) and Travis Henry (2002).
So I decided to dig a little deeper, to see if this was really a trend, and if so, when it began. Thanks to the new database, I was able to pull all seasons since 1970 by a player who played running back or fullback during his career, with fumble info. Now, I cannot tell how many fumbles are due to rushing attempts, receptions, or kick returns or punt returns. Certainly, some of the fumbles by players listed as running backs are occurring on special teams plays, so the first thing I did was find the league-wide running back fumble rates for all touches, where a touch constitutes any play for which a back might have fumbled--rush attempts + receptions + punt returns + kickoff returns. Here is the yearly data for fumble rates on all running back touches, reported as Fumble Rate Per 100 Touches:
Year Fumbles Touches Fum/100 Touch 1970 330 12982 2.54 1971 362 13362 2.71 1972 376 13790 2.73 1973 416 14591 2.85 1974 361 14770 2.44 1975 421 15596 2.70 1976 453 16648 2.72 1977 411 16580 2.48 1978 472 18394 2.57 1979 467 18156 2.57 1980 413 17497 2.36 1981 460 17695 2.60 1982 244 9463 2.58 1983 409 16917 2.42 1984 366 16344 2.24 1985 327 15981 2.05 1986 361 16160 2.23 1987 332 15302 2.17 1988 319 15455 2.06 1989 313 14878 2.10 1990 309 14120 2.19 1991 278 14167 1.96 1992 245 13816 1.77 1993 244 14297 1.71 1994 211 14245 1.48 1995 245 15243 1.61 1996 218 14912 1.46 1997 219 14930 1.47 1998 200 14704 1.36 1999 215 14503 1.48 2000 203 13969 1.45 2001 194 14122 1.37 2002 197 15011 1.31 2003 207 15393 1.34 2004 184 15088 1.22 2005 177 15276 1.16 2006 179 15322 1.17 2007 166 14986 1.11
So, it does appear that the league wide fumble rate for running backs has been dropping since the AFL-NFL merger, and was at an all-time low in 2007. Certainly, some of this must be due to changes in the usage of running backs on special teams, particularly star players. After all, most top running backs today are not involved in the return game, whereas in the 1970's, it was not uncommon for a player like Terry Metcalf or Greg Pruitt to be involved as a return man as well as get a significant amount of touches from scrimmage.
To test how much return touches affect the fumble rate, I divided the seasons into three groups: 1970-1981, 1982-1993, and 1994-present. Then, within each group, I sorted the players by the percentage of touches that were from scrimmage versus on returns. For example, here is the data for the 1994-present group, sorted by return touch percentage (ko & punt ret/total touches):
%Return Fum Touches Fum/100 touches 100.0 71 2082 3.41 80-99.9 94 2854 3.29 60-79.9 64 2376 2.69 40-59.9 124 5870 2.11 20-39.9 154 8378 1.84 .1-19.9 585 42155 1.39 0.00 1723 143989 1.20
Just so you understand what you are looking at here, the 100.0% group represents all players designated as running backs who had all of their touches from special teams returns. The players in the 0.00% represents all running backs who had no special teams returns in a given season in that period. The fumble rate is higher on special teams, and the rates drop progressively depending on the percentage of touches attributable to special teams returns.
However, even the special teams to scrimmage fumble ratios is fairly uniform across eras. For the period 1970-1981, the fumble rate for running backs with zero special teams returns was 2.26 per 100 touches, and for running backs who got all their touches on special teams returns, a whopping 6.80 per 100 touches. The fumble rates on special teams plays appears to be almost three times greater than on scrimmage plays for running backs. The fumble rates for both special teams and scrimmage plays have been dropping steadily though, and the rate for each is about half of what they were in the 1970's.
Taking out special teams touches entirely, here are the fumble rates for only backs who derived all of their touches from scrimmage plays, for 1970-2007. To cut down on the length of tables, I divided the data into four-year groups (except for 2006-2007), but if anyone wants to see each year, let me know (the pattern is similar to the previous one above that includes special teams touches for all seasons). Here are the fumble rates per 100 scrimmage touches (rushes + receptions):
YEARS FUM/100 SCR TOUCH 1970-1973 2.42 1974-1977 2.26 1978-1981 2.15 1982-1985 2.07 1986-1989 1.96 1990-1993 1.64 1994-1997 1.28 1998-2001 1.23 2002-2005 1.15 2006-2007 1.08
Even with punt and kick returns removed from consideration, we see that the fumble rates for running backs have been steadily declining over the last 38 years. Why is this? Clearly, it is not just because of changes in usage rates of primary running backs as special teams returners. Here are my thoughts:
1. Instant Replay
My first reaction when I saw the dramatic drop in the number of running backs with 10+ fumbles toward the latter half of the 1980's was that instant replay was a primary driving force. But after looking at the underlying data, I don't think instant replay is a major driving factor in what we are seeing. Instant replay was first introduced in the NFL for the 1986 season, and the original version was in effect through the 1991 season. The league stopped using replay for the 1992-1998 seasons, before it returned again prior to the 1999 season.
Looking at the data, there is no great decline in fumble rates after instant replay was adopted each time, or at least no greater decline than other periods when their was no change in the usage of replay. In fact, some of the biggest drops in fumble rates occur in the early 1990's, right after the league did away with replay the first time.
This is not to say instant replay is not a contributing factor. Most certainly, there are plays each year where a play that was called a fumble on the field is overturned, and the running back in 2007 does not get credited with a fumble when one in 1975 would have been. But let's assume that there were 32 running back fumbles overturned by replay and ruled down by contact in 2007. An additional 32 fumbles would have only increased the 2007 fumble rate to 1.30 per 100 touches, still well below the rate twenty years earlier.
I guess an argument could also be made that the usage of instant replay has a chilling effect on the officials, and they are far more likely to err on the side of caution, knowing they can be overturned if they rule a play a fumble instead of down by contact. Such an effect would build up over time as officials became more accustomed to being scrutinized by replay. Even if this were true, though, again I don't see it as a major factor.
Which leads me to a couple that I do think might play a role.
2. Changes in Team Climate Situations
When the AFL and NFL merged for the 1970 season, there were 26 teams. Of those 26, only one played in a dome (Houston), five others could be considered warm weather cities (Los Angeles, San Diego, Dallas, New Orleans, and Miami), and three might be considered moderate late season cities (Oakland, San Fransisco, Atlanta). The majority of the league's teams were in cold weather outdoor venues over the latter half of the season, and with the exception of games played in Houston, all were subject to precipation throughout the season.
Over the next thirty years, through expansion (Seattle playing in a dome, Tampa Bay, Jacksonville and Carolina), relocation (Cardinals to Arizona, Rams and Colts to play in a dome) and teams building domed stadiums (New Orleans, Atlanta, Detroit, Minnesota), the league shifted to far more games that were played indoors or in temperate climates later in the season. The changes were gradual, and it was not until the Oilers moved to Tennessee to play outdoors and Seattle moved into an outdoor stadium that there was any kind of shift the other direction.
I don't think climate fully explains the downward trend, but I do think the shift in percentage of games that are subject to bad weather conditions compared to the 1970's and 1980's is one of the driving forces behind the drop in fumble rates.
3. Passing Efficiency
Doug has occasionally used football topics to discuss things like poisson distribution and Benford's law in previous posts. Well, my background is in Biology, so in an effort to justify the money spent taking classes in mammalian cell genetics back in the day, I'm going to use this opportunity to discuss evolutionary biology, natural selection, and adaptation, and how similar concepts may relate to the fumble rate drop for running backs.
Humor me for just a second. Let's assume we have a group of grazing herbivores who live on an isolated island, but one large enough to support the herbivore population, and allow it space to move. On this island, there are no natural predators large enough to threaten the adult population, so it grows at its own pace and develops without any need to adapt to predators.
But then, a new predator is introduced to the island, and it is large enough to attack an average adult herbivore, and fast enough to catch an average adult herbivore. What's going to happen to the herbivore population over time?
It's going to change. Natural selection will result in certain traits being positively selected (and some negative traits being selected against) among the population. Maybe one of those traits is speed and quickness. The faster animals live to mate another day. Maybe it is size. The predator, given plenty of options, will tend to avoid a larger animal that could increase its risk of injury or cause it to expend additional energy. Larger size is then selected, and the smaller, slower animals are removed from the population and don't pass on their genetic traits. Maybe its something like vision, or hearing, to detect the predator and get an early jump. Maybe it is "off the chart" intangibles, so that the herbivores willing to devote hours to film study of predatory behavior are more prepared.
Okay, I'm getting silly, but I had to bring it back to football. Because I think that changes to passing efficiency over the last thirty years is having a profound effect on running back fumble rates. In 1978, the NFL introduced the "Mel Blount" rule regarding contact with a wide receiver outside of five yards from the line of scrimmage, and changed the rules for offensive linemen and pass blocking. There have been numerous other rule changes since then, many also having an effect on offense, usually promoting greater offense, particular passing.
Prior to the rule changes, passing offenses were more risky, featuring higher yards per completion, but lower completion percentages and higher interception percentages. The league wide completion percentages have been steadily climbing as the teams adapted to the rule changes, the West Coast offense became popularized, teams became more sophisticated and varied in their offensive approach, and young quarterbacks trained in these offenses entered the league.
So now picture our running backs and analogize back to the herbivores. We've had a shock to the system caused by the rule changes. Let's compare our fumbling running backs to animals that were smaller in size. Before this shock to the system, they could function just fine because they compensated in other areas. When passing offense was far more risky, teams could tolerate the occasional fumble if it came with an explosive back who could make big plays.
With these changes to the rules, though, the passing offenses become relatively safer and more efficient over time, while still having explosiveness resulting in more big point producing plays than the running game. The big play ability of running backs is still important, but less so when you can more readily get those big plays in the passing game. Thus, it becomes relatively more important that the running back not turn the ball over, to avoid taking the ball out of the hands of his team's increasingly efficient passing game. Much like the smaller animals, the fumblers are selected against with greater pressure than before. And just like a smaller animal better be at the far left of the speed curve to survive in the changed environment, the more fumble prone back better be at the far left of the explosiveness curve, moreso than before. He either adapts, or is so good in every other facet that teams are still willing to tolerate the flaw.
Maybe a Tony Dorsett would still survive because he was exceptional enough in other areas. (Dorsett had 8 or more fumbles in five different seasons). But what about a Wendell Tyler? Tyler had an amazing statistical season but fumbled 10 times in 1982--in a strike-shortened 9 games. And its not like that was an anomaly, as he had fumbled at least 9 times in both seasons where he had played a full schedule before then.
Basically, the tolerance for players like Tyler may have decreased over time, and either they adapted and learned to fumble less, or they got less playing time. The purpose of the running game has changed over time, now serving a greater role in lead preservation, but a smaller role in getting the lead in the first place compared to thirty years ago. Along with this change in focus has been a change in risk tolerance. In my opinion, this is yet another subtle effect of the changes in the passing rule.
Where have all the fumbling running backs gone? Like the Dodo Bird, Thylacine, and Quagga, they have been the victims of natural selection. They either changed their stripes, or they became extinct.
This entry was posted on Monday, June 2nd, 2008 at 4:34 am and is filed under General. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. Both comments and pings are currently closed.

This is interesting. I never knew about the trend of fewer fumbles.
Before I read any of your theories, the first theory that popped into my mind is that NFL players are stronger now, and maybe the RB's have improved arm strength and are able to hold onto the ball better than before. Also, similar to your #3 idea is that maybe as coaches emphasize reducing fumbling over time, players try harder to avoid fumbling, and the bad fumbling players just get filtered out of the league quicker each year.
It really is a fascinating trend.
I had the same thought as Richie: the RBs are getting stronger. You had a post a while back about how BMIs have increased. So you have guys with beefier arms, and a greater emphasis on ball security.
Your point about passing also seems sound. Teams are passing to get a lead, and running to keep it. Running, then, takes place in a risk-averse environment.
If possible, compare running carries when protecting a lead with carries made by teams playing from behind. The BMI theory could also be tested. Higher BMI players might have lower fumble rates across eras.
I think it's that the RBs are stronger now and, as noted in a previous blog entry, bigger. It's probably natural that they are better able to hang on to the ball.
Find your favorite (retired) RB. You may be startled at some of the seasonal fumble totals. Walter Payton had, in his first three years, 9, 10, and 11 fumbles. He cut it down after that.
I think it also may be somewhat of a rookie thing as the best backs in their early years seem to have more fumbles and then cut them down as their career progresses. In Tiki Barber's case, he didn't see heavy carries until the middle of his career so the middle looks higher than his start. Although his fumble rate early on was probably the same or higher.
I looked up Shaun Alexander. He's never had more than 6 in a year. LaDainian Tomlinson had 8 in his first year but then went 3, 2, 6, 3, 2, 0. I brought up the "retired" part earlier with these guys in mind. I don't think the premier RBs today ever really fumbled like their 70s-80s counterparts, or in the same pattern. So, with guys like that as your competition, if you fumble like a 70s-80s back you have less leeway and probably will not get many more carries.
The size thing I'm not sure about. Defensive players are getting stronger too, and would be the ones hitting the back and trying to force the fumble. But its something I can try to look into. Probably need to limit it to backs with a certain number of career touches, so I'm not looking up BMI data for everyone.
The age/experience thing is something that I want to examine, to see if backs do get better at avoiding fumbles with experience, and if so, what the shape of that curve is.
Cool post, JKL. I don't buy the bigger/strong arguments, as LBs and other defenders have similarly increased in physicality.
I think it's natural selection at work. I like the term "lead preservation", and I think it jives well with Why Do Teams Run the Ball?
The next table shows adjusted rushing yards per attempt as a ratio to adjusted net passing yards per attempt. Remember, it was over 100 in the '70s because rushing was actual more effective than passing then. By the '90s, lead preservation kicked in. In the second column, I show the leaguewide fumble data you posted (which includes returners)
Interesting, the correlation coefficient between the two sets of data is 0.75.
Perhaps even more interesting -- doing a bit of data mining, which probably isn't fair -- we can up that CC. The CC between Year N Rush/Pass ratio and Year N+5 Fumble Rate is 0.86. This is justifiable, though. After seeing a development or change in pass/run effectiveness, teams will start to draft -- and recruit differently. Five years may be too long of a frame; drop it to 3 years, and the CC is 0.79.
Using the four year data, which excludes ST fumbles, the CC between the Rush/Pass Ratio (avg over 4 years) is 0.82. If we look at the delay effect, the ratio becomes 0.87. So if we say there's a four year lag, looking at the four year data, that 0.87 is pretty robust. That would mean that about 75% of the fumble ratio in any year can be explained by the league wide true rush/true pass ratios of four years earlier.
I've had a bit of a think and I have the following possibilities to suggest:-
Improved training to prevent fumbles
RBs are quicker these days so they get through the hole quicker so there is less impetus for them to go for the risky "extra effort" but to get the knee down & kill the play before the defense can strip the ball.
Defenses might be drilled to go for the safe wrap-up tackle rather than the riskier attepted strip that could end up missing & leaving a (quicker) RB in space. If I was a DC I'd prefer to give up the extra 1% chance of a fumble to reduce the number of 10+ yard gains
I agree that everybody is getting bigger, but I don't think it would equally affect fumbling.
I think if a RB improves his arm strength, he can hold onto the ball tighter. Players usually don't fumble because the defender pulls the ball from his arms. Fumbles primarily happen from: butterfingers, helmet hit to the ball and hard hits to other body parts causing the ball to pop out.
I think if a LB is bigger and stronger than he was 25 years ago, his increase in hitting power/momentum probably doesn't increase as much as the arm strength increase to hold onto the ball.
I think this might be a bit of a self-fulfilling prophecy. The RB's who are not able to improve on their fumbling rates won't stay in the league very long.
This sounds like a theory of improved tackling & fundamentals.
I don't know if it's true or not, but the general implication amongst experts is that tackling & fundamentals is decreasing. Teams rarely (never?) practice tackling now. Players are accused of being bigger showboats and trying harder for the spectacular play instead of steadily making the fundamental ones.
Richie (#8), I would agree that would be a problem if I was just looking at all running backs. I would probably do something like including only RB's who had X number of rush/rec touches in 5 or more seasons, or players who played between a certain age range, so that I'm not comparing John Avery's fumble rate at age 23 to Curtis Martin's at age 29. I'm thinking something like 200+ touches in at least 5 seasons, and see what kind of sample size I get. If you've got any ideas, let me know. I won't have time to look at it right away, but it might be a future post.
An idea that pops into my head is that with the rise of short-passing offenses, maybe RBs get more receptions than they used to. Thus, RBs with better hands for the ball are more valuable than they used to be. Guys with "hands of stone" won't be considered NFL-level running backs in the modern era, and these guys might be the big fumblers. Or maybe the expansion of the RB as receiver has led to an increased focus on hands when coaching RBs?
Granted, this assumes that (a) RBs catch way more passes than they used to, and (b) receiving ability correlates to a lack-of-butterfingers and thus fewer fumbles. One would be easy to check, the other, well I don't know.
When did the 'ground can not cause a fumble' rule come into effect?
There a number of reasons why this might be the case:
1) RBs are stronger now than in the past.
2) Top RBs are shorter now than in the past which generally means they are quicker, harder to get a good shot on, their arms are shorter so it is harder to wrench the ball away, and they aren't looking for contact.
3) Domes
4) Rule changes
5) Linebackers may be getting smaller to defend the pass and may no longer be able to key on the RB nearly as much.
6) Replay
7) Players protect the ball more (you don't see guys holding a ball in 1 hand away from their body anymore).
8) Tolerance of fumbling has changed.
#13, wouldn't shorter arms make it harder for a RB to hold onto the ball?
Miles (above) asks a vital question. What about the rule that the ground cannot cause a fumble come into effect? Being an old timer of watching the league (since 1966) my impression is that many fumbles in the past would not be fumbles now because of the stricter rule--i.e. the ground cannot cause a fumble. Without lots of tape or video to watch first hand I can only report that in the past lots of time ball players would be technically down but the ball would come loose and it was ruled a fumble. Not so now--and we have instant replay to help out. So, using the Law of Parsimony, I think this factor should be considered first.
All else is speculation until this factor is accounted for.
Ground Awarded Game Ball After Causing Key Fumble
My first thought was that this is more a change in officiating rather than playing. I haven't been watching football long enough to have anything more than a gut feeling though.
I hadn't considered the fact that teams used to still run the ball a lot when down. It makes a lot of sense if the RB is trying to break a big play, his chance of fumbling would go up. I grew up with Bill Walsh and the 49ers so I guess I'm just not old enough, or at least on the wrong coast.
Another thing that occurred to me is that fumbles per carry probably go up with carries per game -- A player who carries it 40 times in a game is probably more than twice as likely to fumble it as somebody with 20 carries. With your lovely database, you could probably tell. IF that's true, AND if average carries per game has been going down over the years, then that might explain some of the difference too.
There isn't a "ground can't cause a fumble" rule is there? I always thought it was just a logical extension of the basic rules that tell when a player is down.
The ground CAN cause a fumble in cases where the ball-carrier hasn't been contacted by a defender. But if the ball-carrier had been in contact with a defender while or just before going to the ground there can't be a fumble because he's down the moment he touches the ground.
I can't imagine how the NFL could have ever done this differently unless the rules for when a player is down were different, which doesn't seem likely (hitting the ground making a player down is as "natural" a rule as there could be).
What are the trends for QB and WR fumbles over the same period? That should help with the nature/nurture argument.
Hasn't the league changed the regulations about balls over the past couple of decades? Do RBs run off tackle more or less than in the past? Is there less gang-tackling as fewer teams play eight (or nine) in the box?
One thing has always struck me: losing teams have more rushing fumbles. In some instances the same player will have fumble problems when his team are behind, and they'll vanish when it's in front. Clearly, there's a difference in attitude, on behalf of the back and probably the defense too. The equivalent of QBs "forcing it"?
#14
No, the longer the arms the more leverage a defender has to strip the ball. It isn't like the runners' arms are too short to hold the ball comfortably.
One thing has always struck me: losing teams have more rushing fumbles. In some instances the same player will have fumble problems when his team are behind, and they’ll vanish when it’s in front. Clearly, there’s a difference in attitude, on behalf of the back and probably the defense too. The equivalent of QBs “forcing it”?
My first thought is that it's just a matter of the different goals teams have when they are losing vs. when they are winning. When your team's losing by a considerable margin, and there isn't a lot of time left in the game, it matters more to get big plays than it does to reduce the risk of a turnover. When you're trailing in the fourth quarter, low risk-low reward doesn't work. You need to get a high reward (in terms of points), so you have to take higher risks (in terms of fumble likelihood). On the other hand, if your team's winning by a fair amount, your goal is to make sure that no matter what, you don't turn the ball over. So there, low risk strategies are much more advantageous.
I don't think it's psychological as much as it is strategic. For instance, I bet Hail Mary passes get picked off way more than most others, and I bet they're thrown almost exclusively by teams that are losing, but I doubt those facts have anything to do with the QB being nervous or rattled or the defense being particularly calm or focused.
My first thought on seeing the evidence of the trend has been touched on above, but rather surprisingly not really explored.
So, ample anecdotal evidence (such as the Tomlinson and Payton numbers cited above) appears to reinforce the intuitively plausible notion that fumbling is extensively a technical problem. Players, or at any rate some players, can learn to fumble less. So while I buy the idea that some change in priorities on the part of coaches and/or personnel departments is likely to have driven the change, and may well itself have been driven by the increased importance of passing, I disagree with the posited evolutionary process. I don't think players are being more strongly selected for decreased fumble-proneness, so much as coached out of it, as soon as they reach a level at which they can no longer get away with it, and sometimes sooner. I think if the backs from 30 years ago were playing with today's rules, coaching and culture, their fumble rates would drop dramatically.
Consider the next island in the archipelago. Its only animal inhabitants are monkeys. The island is wooded with two kinds of tree: one that produces soft fruit, and one that produces nuts, with exceptionally tough shells. A few of the monkeys have worked out how to crack the nuts, by placing them on one rock and hitting them with another, but it's far more effort than securing the same nutritional value from the fruit, so the majority simply eat the fruit. One year, a virulent fruit tree blight arrives on the island - spores blown on the wind, perhaps. The fruit trees begin to die, and the supply of fruit gradually dwindles, first to a level below that needed to support the original monkey population, and eventually almost to nothing. Certain monkeys - the strongest and most aggressive, can still live on fruit, jealously guarding the few remaining trees. The monkeys who already knew how to crack the nuts prosper, of course. But what happens to the remainder - those monkeys who never learned to crack nuts and are not exceptional physical specimens? They might die out, but I think it is far more likely that they learn to crack nuts, by imitation. A few may be unable to master the technique - perhaps they lack the required co-ordination; perhaps they tend to doze off in nut-cracking tape study sessions. But overall, the evolutionary impact of the tree blight on the monkeys is minimal. The population does not acquire new traits, only new skills.
One possible contributing factor. Running backs run out of bounds a lot more nowadays. Guys in the past battled and fought for extra yards, where they may have been more apt to lose the ball.
Plus the emphasis on ball security and techniques related to protecting the ball must contribute.
I was playing the Strat-o-Matic football computer game, simulating the 1986 season, when I came to the end of the season and notice the high number of fumbles. My Cowboys finished 3-13 because Danny White has 26 fumbles and lost 14 of them. I thought there must be an error in the game data and then noticed Eric Dickerson with the Rams having 15 fumbles as well. So I looked up the actual stats from the real 1986 season and both of them did average about 1 fumble lost per game which was mind blowing to me. So I searched and found this article. It's very informative.
Personally I think the higher playing standards of today are the reason why turnovers are down. You fumble more than once per game and you get cut. Quarterback plays are more conservative (which with the qb rating system makes them appear more "efficient") throwing more short passes and thus leading to less interceptions. Look at the drop in Yards per Attempt in the last 20 years.
I agree with the weather/climate factor. Also, I think the glove technology has improved the ability to hold onto the ball. Lastly, I don't really know when the rule went into effect whereby the player is down when forward progress is stopped, but even besides the rule itself, it seems that there has been an emphasis on blowing the play dead quicker and quicker over the years, causing less time for players to be stripped of the ball while being held-up by opponents. One question --- has the texture of the ball changed?
Oh, and one more thought...
Is it possible that the change in emphasis has been on the other side of the ball? By that, I mean that defenses may have de-emphasized stripping the ball in favor of wrapping-up the player for the tackle.